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State Inheritance Tax on Foreign-Held
Bonds or Notes Secured by a Mortgage on Land in the State
MELBER B. CHAMBERS*

I.
For many years inheritance tax laws have loomed increasingly
large in the lawyer's practice. Numberless cases have arisen involving their construction and constitutionality. Here as in other parts
of the law of taxation the courts have been trying to chart their way
through, a myriad of intricate problems. Taking one step at a time,
aided by a few tried principles, they have attempted to describe
the jurisdiction of a state to tax.
One of these problems of jurisdiction which has not yet been
before the Supreme Court is whether a state can tax the inheritance
of foreign-held bonds or notes ,which are secured by a mortgage on
land in the state. Has a state power to levy such a tax or would it
run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment?
This question is presented under the inheritance tax statute of
practically every state." It cannot be avoided by construction, by a
decision that the legislature did not intend to include the transfer of

suchl n -ornot bs-3wit~hin, the-ta , for -thelegislatures have invariably made clear their intention to tax all the transfers within their
2

power.
It was early decided that a state could tax any property within
the state.3 And it lias sincebeen deternlifid that the same test will
*Of the New York Bar.
'The following is a typical provision for a tax upon the property of a nonresident decedent: "A tax shall be and is hereby imposed upon the transfer
of any property, real or personal or mixed, or of any interest therein or income
therefrom * * * in the following cases: * * * (b) When the transfer is by will
or intestate laws of property within the state and the decedent was a non-resident
of the state at the time of his death." Statutes of South Carolina, I922, Vol.
32,2 p. 800.

Some statutes state that the tax shall affect all property over which the state
has jurisdiction for purposes of taxation, e. g., No. 188 Michigan Public Acts of
x899, § 21; New York Laws of z892, Ch. 399, § § I, 22; Minn. Laws 19o5, p.
427, c. 288, § i, as amended Laws of I9ri, p. 5i6, c. 372, § i. The typical statute
as set forth in note i, supra, accomplishes the same result by describing the
taxable property as "all property within the state". Such a statute "is as broad
as the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth". Kinney v. Treasurer & Receiver
General, 207 Mass. 368, 369, 93 N. E. 586, 587 (1910).
3McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316, 429 (1819); State Tax on
Foreign Held Bonds, i5 Wall. (U. S.) 30o (1872); Kintzing v. Hutchinson, Fed.
Cas. No. 7834, 14 Fed. Cas. 645 (i877).
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tell whether a state has the power to tax the inheritance of property
as will tell whether it has the power to tax the property itself. "** *
The principle that the subject to be taxed must be within the jurisdiction of the state applies as well in the case of a transfer tax as in
that of a property tax. A state has no power to tax the devolution
of the property of a non-resident unless it has jurisdiction over the
property devolved or transferred." 4 It may also be said that the true
basis of the inheritance tax is the service rendered by the state in
supplying its law to govern the transfer, and that as to non-residents
it renders that service only for transfers of property that is within the
state. But whether or not that reasoning is accepted, the essential
requisite of jurisdiction for either the direct property tax or the inheritance tax upon property of a non-resident is the presence of the
property within the state.5 This principle has become firmly fixed
among the principles of the common law of Conflict of Laws and of
our Constitutional Law.6
The general question to arise under these statutes, therefore, was
whether or not this or that property belonging to a non-resident
decedentwas "withinthe state". Did it have a situs there? About
immovables there of course was never any question.7 Their situs
was fixed. About movables there was at first some doubt. There was
the long revered doctrine of nzobilia personam sequuntusr. Or, as
stated in many of the early decisions, "personal property having no
situs of its own attends the person and domicil of its owner". 9 But
the fiction was soon made to yield to the facts. When the judge
could look out of the court house window and see the horse and the
wagon, the furniture and the working tools-all a part of the estate
of the non-resident decedent-he found some difficulty in convincing
4
Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 492, 45 Sup. Ct., 6o3 (1925); Rhode
Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U. S. 69, 80 (1926); Matter of

Estate
of Swift, 137 N. Y. 77, 85-86, 32 N. E. so96, 1o98 (x896).
5
1t is not necessary to state here that the "presence" must not be merely
temporary but must have some permanence. The property must haVe a situs
there. Rays v. Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 17 How. (U. S.)- 5 96 (1854). See collection
of 6cases in (5918) 28 YALE L. J. 525.
jurisdiction to tax the inheritance of any property having a situs outside the
state could only be based upon the residence of the owner within the state.
Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 U. S. 54,38 Sup. Ct. 40 (1917).
But see Frick v. Pennsylvania, supra note 4. But we are not concerned here
with the power of a state to impose a personal tax. Our inquiry is limited to a
consideration of the inheritance tax based upon jurisdiction over the property.
7Hoyt v. The Commissioners of Taxes, 23 N. Y. 224, 226 (i861); 28 YALE
L. f. 525, 526.
S'Mobiia personam sequuntur is a maxim of law as old as the law itself."
Mondah Trust v. Sheehan, 45 Mont. 424, 123 Pac. 692 (19r2); Hornthal v.
Burwell, 5O9 N. C. IO, z3 S. E. 721 (189i).
gKintzing v. Hutchinson, et al., supra, note 3.
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himself that these mobiliawere not within his state but were following
the person of the owner. So the fiction was held not to limit the taxing power of the state of actual situs. All tangibles, movable and
immovable, could be subjected to a direct property tax and to an
inheritance tax in the state where they were physically present. 10
The situs of many kinds of intangibles for the purpose of taxation
is still undetermined. There are few parts of the law of equal importance so unsettled. A long line of state decisions will suddenly
find itself called to account by the Supreme Court and an accepted
doctrine will be overturned."
At first, relying upon the old maxim mobilia, the courts fixed the
situs of all intangibles at the domicil of the owner." And there
alone were they taxable.
The first weakening of the maxim is found in the cases of business
situs. When a bond or note or other intangible was connected with a
business in some other place than the domicil of the owner, they
were said to have acquired a situs there. This localization of the debt
gave a basis for taxation. Since it was property within the state, it
could be made subject to the state's property and inheritance tax.'3
A doctrine of the law merchant has also been used to break in
upon the maxim when bonds or notes were the intangibles in question.
The bond and the note has long been considered to be not merely
evidence of the obligation but the obligation itself. They pass freely
from hand to hand and have value in themselves. "It is not primitive
10Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 6 Sup. Ct. 475 (I886); American Steel & Wire
Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500,24Sup. Ct. 500 (1904); Mills v. Thornton, 26 Ill.
300
(1861); Scollard v. American Felt Co., 194 Mass. 127, 8o N. E. 233 (1Q907);
Tobey v. Kip, 214 Mass. 477, IOI N. E. 998 (1913); John Hancock Ice Co. v.

Rose, 67 N. J. L. 86, 5o Atl. 364 (19Ol); Lehigh & Wilkesbarre Coal Co. v.
Junction, 75 N. J. L. 68, 66 Atl. 923 (1907); People v. Dunckel, 69 N. Y. Misc.
361, 125 N. Y. Supp. 385 (I9IO).
"Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36, (1905);

Frick v. Pennsylvania, supra note 4.

1State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 300 (1872); Kirtland v.
Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491 (1879); Holland v. Commissioners, 15 Mont. 460, 39
Pac. 575 (1895); Small's Estate, I5I Pa. I, 25 Atl. 23 (1892); Goldgart v. The

People, IO6 Ill. 25 (1883); Street Railroad Co. v. Morrow, 87 Tenn. 406, 434,
II S. W. 348 (1888); Kintzing v. Hutchinson et al., supranote 3. But see Joyslin's Estate, 76 Vt. 88, 56 Atl. 281 (1902).
3
1 New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309, 20 Sup. Ct. 110 (1899); Bristol v. W.
County, 177 U. S. 133, 20 Sup. Ct. 585 (1900); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395, 27 Sup. Ct. 499 (1907); Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S.
392, 27 Sup. Ct. 712 (,907); Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Orleans Assessors, 221 U. S.
346, 31 Sup. Ct. 550 (I9IO); Buck v. Miller, 147 Ind.586, 45 N.E. 647 (1897);
National Fire Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 121 La. 108, 46 So. 117 (1908);
State ex rel Langer v. Packard, 40 N. D. 182, 168 N. W. 673 (1918); People v.
Smith, 88 N. Y. 576 (1882); State v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 35 Tex. Civ. App.
232, 80 S.W. 554 (1904); Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt. 152 (1849); ContraJack v. Walker, 79 Fed. 138 (1897); Baars v. City of Grand Rapids, 129 Mich. 572, 89N.W.
328 (1902).
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tradition alone that gives their peculiarities to bonds, but a tradition
laid hold of, modified and adapted to the convenience and understanding of business men. The same convenience and understanding
apply to bills and notes * * ,"14 So it has been held that the obligations of bonds and notes although unconnected with any business
have a situs where the bonds and notes are permanently kept, as do
chattels, and they are taxable there. 5
A third place where it has been contended that the obligation of a
bond or note may be localized for purposes of taxation is at the domicil of the debtor. In the absence of a controlling Supreme Court
decision much has been written concerning this contention both
in the opinions of State courts and in legal periodicals. Learned
jurists have arrayed themselves on each side of the controversy. 8
It is clear that the debt not represented by a tangible form cannot
have a situs.Y7

So attempts to seize upon the place of residence

of the debtor as a means of localizing the obligation must be regarded
as unsound. Let the process of localization be applied only when
the obligation is represented by some tangible form or is attached to
some business and then only when some good reason exists, as in
the two instances already discussed.
It is true that the debt is protected by the state of the debtor's
domicil, but so is it protected by every other state into which the debtor goes. There he may be sued and the debt collected. If there were
some strong social interest in finding a basis for a tax on a debt at
the domicil of the debtor, then consideration might be given to this
14

Mr. Justice Holmes in Wheeler v. Sohner, 233 U. S. 434, 439, 34 Sup. Ct.

6075 (1914).

' Scottish Union & National Insurance Company v. Bowland, 196 U. S. 61I,
Sup. Ct. 345 (1904); Wheeler v. Sohmer, supra note 14; Walker v. Jack, 88
Fed. 576 (1898); Callahan v. Woodbridge, I7I Mass. 595, 51 N. E. 176 (1898);
Kennedy v. Hodges, 215 Mass. 112, 1O2 N. E. 432 (1913); State v. County
Court, 69 Mo. 454 (i88o); Matter of Whiting, 15o N. Y. 27, 44 N. E. 715 (1896);
Matter of Morgan, 150 N. Y. 35, 44 N. E. 1126 (1896); In re Gates Estate, 243
25

N. Y. 193, 153 N. E. 47 (1926); Matter of Tiffany, 143 App. Div. 327 (911),
aff'd. 202 N. Y. 550, 95 N. E. 1140; Hall v. Miller, 102 Texas 289, 1i S. W.
1168 (19o9). Contra: Estate of McCahill, I7I Cal. 482, 153 Pac. 930 (1915);
Howell v. Gordon, 127 Mich. 517, 86 N. W. lO42 (19O1); Myers v. Seaberger,
45 Ohio St. 232, 12 N. E. 796 (1887); Orcutt's Appeal, 97 Pa. St. 179 (1881).
' 8 Professor Joseph H. Beale, (1914) 27 HARV. L. REV. 107, 114 and (1919) 32

HARV. L. REv. 586, 604; Professor Charles E. Carpenter, Jurisdiction over Debts
for the Purpose of Administration, etc., (1918) 31 HARV. L. Rxv. 918; Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277 (1903); Street Railway Co. v.
Morrow, 87 Tenn. 438,
S.W. 348 (1888); Walker v.People, 64 Colo. 143, 171
Pac. 747 (1918). For limitations on the doctrine of the dictum of Blackstone v.
Miller, see: Matter of Gordon 186 N. Y. 471, 79 N. E. 722, IO.L. R. A. (N. s.)
1O89 (19o6); Bliss v. Bliss, 221 Mass. 201, O9 N. E. 148, L. R. A. 1916 A, 889

(1916).
17 Street Railway Co. v. Morrow, supra note 16.
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protection given there, or emphasis might be laid upon the better
protection given there where physical presence of the debtor is not
necessary for enforcement of the debt. But, on the contrary, the demands of a fair system of taxation are against it. Taxation of a debt
at the domicil of the debtor would duplicate the tax at the domicil
of the creditor. The power of the creditor's domicil to tax the debt
has already been upheld by the Supreme Court-not because of
the old maxim mobilia, but because the creditor himself is subject
to the power of that State.18 So small distinctions and degrees of
protection should not be searched out to support a second tax.
Is there to be still another place suggested for the localization -ofthe
bond or note?, If there is security, if the obligation is secured by a
mortgage, may the state where the land is situated claim the situs?
Can it say the security ties the obligation down and makes it property
within its bounds and thus subjects it to its taxing power? Let us see
how the courts have dealt with this problem.
II.
There are three pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court. The
first, the leading case of State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 9 arose
under a Pennsylvania statute which directed every domestic corporation which paid interest to its bondholders and other creditors to
deduct "a tax of five per centum upon every dollar of interest paid as
aforesaid * * *"

The question before the court was whether the

statute, so far as it applied to the interest on bonds of the Cleveland,
Painesville and Ashtabula R. R. Co., issued to and held by nonresidents of the State of Pennsylvania and secured by mortgage on
land in Pennsylvania and Ohio, was a valid and constitutional
exercise of the taxing power of the state. The court held that it
was not.
At first blush it 'would appear that the court rested its decision
upon one ground alone, that of the contract clause of the Federal
Constitution. If that were true, 'then the decision would be of little
moment and would have been little heard of since. That it did rely
in part upon that ground is undoubtedly trueY0 But the greater
'sKirtland v. Hotthliss supra note 12; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v.
Louisville 245 U. S. 54, 38 Sup. Ct. 40 (1917); Kintzing v. Hutchinson et al
supranote 3. See Bullenv. Wisconsin 240 U. S. 625, 631,36 Sup. Ct. 473 (1915);
Maguire
v. Trefry 253 U. S. 12, 40 Sup. Ct. 417 (1919).
9
120Supra, note i.

"It is a law which interferes 'between the company and the 'bondholder, and
under the pretence of levying a tax commands the company to withhold a portion
of the stipulated interest and pay it over to the State. It is a law which thus
impairs the obligation of contract between the parties." (Page 320).
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part of the opinion deals not with the contract clause but with the
principal point in the decision: the extraterritoriality of the Pennsylvania statute.20 So we have the often quoted passage:21
"The power of taxation, however vast in its character and
searching in its extent, is necessarily limited to subjects within
the jurisdiction of the State. These subjects are persons, property, and business. * * * Corporations may be taxed, like natural
persons, upon their property and business. But debts owing
by corporations, like debts owing by individuals, are not property of the debtors in any sense; they are obligations of the debtors
and possess value only in the hands of the creditors. With them
they are property, and in their hands they may be taxed * * *
The bonds issued by the railroad company in this case are undoubtedly property, but property in the hands of the holders,
not property of the obligors. So far as they are held by nonresidents of the State, they are property beyond the jurisdiction
of the State * * The law * * * is not, therefore, a legitimate exercise of the taxing power."
The court then referred to the Pernsylvania -case of Maltby v.
Reading & Columbia RailroadCo., cited by counsel to support the tax.
It disagreed with and refused to adopt the reasoning of -thePennsylvania court that the bond of the non-resident was itself property in
the State because secured by a mortgage on property there. This it
considered unsound.
Bonds have no taxable situs at the domicil of the debtor; the fact
that bonds are secured by a mortgage on land in the state does not
give them a taxable situs there-these are the two principles for
which the case stands and which have caused the decision to be
regarded as one of the first landmarks in the law of taxation.
But, it has been urged, this case has been so cut down by later
decisions that it has been practically overruled. 22 Of course it must
be recognized that the dictum in the case -thatthe bonds are taxable
only at the domicil of the owner is unsound and has since been quite
20aThis doctrine of extraterritoriality soon became swallowed up in theverbiage
of the due process clause as the Fourteenth Amendment outgrew its narrow Civil
War significance.
2P. 319, 320.
22(1918)3 HARV. L. Rv. 905. In this article Professor Carpenter cites Savings
& Loan Society v. Multnomah County, Blackstone v. Miller and Bristol v.
Washington County. The first two of these will be treated in the text. In
the third case a tax on notes owned by.non-residents and secured by mortgages
on land within the state is sustained on the ground that the notes and mortgages
had a situs within the state, being kept there for the owners by a resident agent.
In other words, this is a case of "business situs," and is clearly distinguishable
from State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds. The court quoted with approval the
following words of the Minnesota Court: "The creditor, however, may give it
(a credit) a business silas * * * as where he places it in the hands of an agent
for collection or renewal, with a veiw to reloaning the money and keeping it
invested as a permanent business."
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properly disregarded. The discard of that dictum was but a part
of the gradual decay of the fiction mobilia personam sequuntur.
And it must also be noted that another dictum in the opinion concerning the mortgagee's interest in land was an incorrect statement of
the Pennsylvania law of Mortgages and was subsequently justly
criticised and disregarded by the Court.23 But considering the actual
decision in the case, stripped of all dicta, it is submitted that the case
remains unshaken by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
'There are two important cases to be considered. The first of these
is Savings & Loan Society v. Multnomah County.2 4 In that case
the court expressly distinguished State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds,
clearly evidencing its intent not to disturb that decision. Mr.
Justice Gray in his opinion said:
"In that case, a railroad company, incorporated both in
Ohio and Pennsylvania, had issued bonds secured by a mortgage
of its entire road in both States; and the tax imposed by the
State of Pennsylvania, which was held by a major ty of this
court to be invalid, was a tax upon the interest due to the bondholders upon the bonds, and was not a tax upon the railroad,
or upon the mortgage thereof, or upon the bondholders solely
by reason of their interest in that mortgage."2 5
Not only is it a fact that the court clearly evinced its desire to let
the decision in the Foreign Held Bonds case stand, but it could not
have overruled that case even if it had so desired. The facts before it
called for no such decision. The court in the Multnonah County
case was confronted with the question of the validity of a statute
which levied a tax on the mortgagor's and mortgagee's interests
in the land. The statute in the ForeignHeld Bonds case levied a tax
on the interest on bonds; by no feat of construction could it be considered to levy a tax upon an interest in land. The facts of the two
cases are easily distinguishable and require two entirely distinct
decisions."
The second case supposed to have overruled State Tax on Foreign
Held Bonds is Blackstone v. Miller.2 7 That was a case arising under
the New York Inheritance Tax Law.28 Mr. Justice Holmes in the
opinion said that the property involved "consisted of a debt of
$1o,692.24, due to the deceased by afirm, andof thenet sum of $4,843,=Savings & Loan Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 42i, 428, 18 Sup.
Ct.24392 (1897).

Siupra, note 23.
.1d. p. 428.
2
6Contra: (1918) 31 HARv. L. REV. 905, 929.
27188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277 (1903).
28
The wording of the statute was the same as that in the South Carolina statute
quoted in note i.
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456.72 held on a deposit account by the United States Trust Company of New York." The decedent was a resident of Illinois and his
entire estate, including the New York property had been subjected
to an inheritance tax there. The court affirmed the decree of the
Surrogate's Court holding the tax valid as to both the debt and
the deposit. There were two grounds given for the decision: (i) The
deposit should be treated like a tangible chattel since as a practical
matter money in the bank is treated like coin in the pocket;29 (2)
Because of New York's power over the person of the debtor it has
jurisdiction over the transfer and hence can subject the transfer to
a tax.
The first ground is sound. Taxation being a practical matter, the
customs of the business world should be given recognition. The man
in the street treats money in the bank as money in the pocket. If he
has a balance in the bank of $500. he considers that he has $500. in
cash. The law properly takes into account and gives effect tothis
state of mind. It treats a deposit as it does a tangible chattel;
each has a situs for taxation where it is located. And, it is submitted, this sufficiently explains the entire case. The second ground
is not needed. 30 Of course, that would not be so if the facts were as
stated in the opinion. If there were a simple debt of $zo,692.24
in the case, then the second ground would be needed to support the
decision as to it. It clearly appears, however, from the report of
the case in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New
York, that the "debt due to the deceased by a firm" was the balance
of a deposit account kept by the deceased with Cuyler, Morgan &
Co., a firm of bankers. The Appellate Division correctly treated
this as it treated the other item-as a bank deposit, and held them
both to be subject to the New York tax under Matter of Houdayer.31
Thus the decision when restricted to its precise facts holds merely
that a bank deposit has a taxable situs where the bank is located.
It has no effect upon the situs or taxability of other forms of obli2
gations.
29
This had been the view of the New York Courts and the ground for their
decisions both in this case(69 App. Div. 127) and in Matter of Houdayer, iSo N.Y.

37,3044N. E. 718 (1896).

A criticism of this doctrine has already been given in Part I.
Matter of Blackstone, 69 App. Div. 127, 74 N. Y. Supp. 508 (Ist Dept.
1902), aff'd 171 N. Y. 682.
The court said at page 129, "The facts as presented
in Matter of Houdayer (i5o N. Y. 37) involve, in principle, every question
presented by the facts in this case, and arose under substantially the same
circumstances. The deposits were held to be money for all practical purposes,
owned by the decedent at the time of his death, and as such taxable under the
Transfer
Tax Act of the State."
32
This is recognized in the discussion of the case in Chambers v. Mumford, 187
Cal. 228, 201 Pac. s88 (1921), and in McLaughlin v. Cluff, 240 Pac. 161, 163,
(Utah, 1925).
31
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Furthermore, it should be noted that Mr. Justice Holmes specifically distinguished the case from State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds.
His words were:
"There is no conflict between our views and the point decided in* * * State Tax on ForeignHeld Bonds, 15 Wall. 3oo * * *
Bonds and negotiable instruments are more than merely evidences of debt. The debt is inseparable from the paper which
declares and constitutes it, by a tradition which comes down
from more archaic conditions. Bacon v. Hooker, 177 Mass. 335,
337. Therefore, considering only the place of the property, it
was held that bonds held out of the State could not be reached.
The decision has been cut down to its precise point by later
S.
cases. Savings & Loan Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. '33
421, 428; New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309, 319, 320.

This distinction between notes and bonds on the one hand and
other forms of obligations on the other has again been approved
by the Supreme Court in a recent decision.34
Thus we find the law upon the point decided in State Tax on Foreign
Held Bonds unchanged by these subsequent decisions. Rather than
any waivering in the court's adherence to the decision, there has been
repeated expression of approval. 5 Securing a bond by a mortgage
does not localize it in the state where the land is situated and does not
subject it to taxation there.
II.
The weight of judicial decision-in the state courts is in full accord.
Whether the tax in question be a property tax8 or an inheritance
tax37 it is agreed with little dissent that the mortgage will not localize
ZSupra note 27.
14Wheeler v. Sohmer, supra note 4.
35Besides the cases already cited, see Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, supra note

-2.

For a contrary view see (1918) 31 HARV. L. REV. 905, 93o, where Professor Car-

penter says: "The situation is now ripe for a decision by the United States Szpreme
Court squarely overruling State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds."
26Territory v. Delinquent Tax List, 3 Ariz. 179, 24 Pac. I82 (7890); People v.
Eastman, 25 Cal. 6oi (1864); Arapahoe County v. Cutter, 3 Colo. 349 (1877);
Goldgart v. The People, supra note 12; Foresman v. Byrns, 68 Ind.247 1879);
-State v. Smith, 68 Miss. 79, 8 So. 294 (1890); Crispin v. Vansyclde,.49 N.J. L.
366, 8 Atl. 120 (1887); Capital Bank v. Wallace, 45 N. D. 182, 177 N. W. 440
(1920); Grant v. Jones, 39 Ohio St. 506 (1883); Street Railroad Company v.
Morrow, supra note I2; State v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 161 Wis. viy,
152

37

N. W. 848

(I915).

Kintzing v. Hutchinson, supra note 3; Chambers v. Mumford, supra note
32; Walker v. People, supranote 16; Gilbertson v. Oliver, 329 Ia. 568, 305 N. W.
33 Minn. 17, 157 N. W. 3076, 158 N. W.
1002 (3906); State v. Chadwick,
256 Mo.Matter
98, i65 S. W.319 (913); Matter of Bronson,
637
350 (1916);
N.Y. I, Statev.
44N. E.Lewis,
707 (3896);
of Fearing, 200 N. Y.34o, -93 N. '. 956
(I9I); Matter of Preston, 75Ap P.Div.25o78N.Y.Supp.
91, (2d Dept. 902);
, 54 At!. 665
Small's Estate, supra note x; DeNoaille's Estate, 236 Pa.
(e9,2);
McLaughlin v. Cluff, supra note 32.
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the obligation. The security does not make the bond or note property
within the state.3 8
,Mr. Justice Lurton in Street Railroad Company v. Morrow 9 tersely
stated the doctrine in these words:
"That these debts are secured by a mortgage upon property
situated here can make no difference * * * In this State, as in
Pennsylvania, the mortgagee's interest in the mortgaged land is
but a security for the debt-the debt being the principal and
the land only an incident. McGann v. Marshal, 7 Hum. 121."
It was said by Chief Justice Thatcher in Commissioners of Arapahoe
County v. Culter,40 a case of trust deeds instead of mortgage:
"Although the situs of the real estate by which the notes
were secured was within the jurisdiction of the taxing power,
the debts evidenced by the notes were the principal things,
and the trust deeds securing them were mere incidents, depending for their very existence upon what they secured. The
liquidation of the debts would at once cancel the trust deeds."
The basis for the contention that the mortgage should localize
the obligation would be that the creditor must resort to the law
of the.state where the land is situated to take advantage of his
security. The same argument was found in the opinion in Blackstone v. Miller-there the protection afforded the debt by the state
of the debtor's domicil through its control over him, here the protection afforded the debt by the state where the land is situated
through its control over the land. As it was unsound there so, it is
submitted, it is unsound here. The bond or note holder here as
there has his right in personam against the debtor enforcible wherever
he can obtain personal service of the debtor..
.
The contention was urged in Walker v. People,41 but the court
refused to adopt it. Mr. justice Bailey said:4
"It is contended by the state that the fact that the payment
of the bonds is secured upon property within the State brings
them, as evidence of this debt, within its power for the purpose
of taxation, on the ground, among others, that creditors are
compelled to invoke local laws to enforce the obligation * * *
It will be observed that in some of the cases the domicil of the
owner has been held to furnish the test of jurisdiction for
the purpose of taxation, while in others this test has yielded to
the actual situs of the property within the territorial limits
38
The cases properly make no distinction between corporate and individual
bonds or notes. Matter of Preston, supra note 37; see cases cited in notes 36
and 37.
39
4 Supra note 12.
OSupra note 36.
4
'Supra note 16.
pp. 145, 150.
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of the taxing authority, but in no case has the domicil of the
debtor, or the location of the securities, been taken as a situs
for the purpose of taxation in the absence of some special
circumstance which the court considered gave it an actual situs.
No such circumstance exists here * * * The conclusion must be
that the bonds are exempt from taxation in Colorado."
The Court of Appeals of New York is also strongly committed
to the majority view. The first and leading case, Matter of Bronson,
arose in 1896 under the typical form of statute4 3 Although the bonds
considered were secured by a mortgage of New York land,44 the court
made no mention of the fact in its opinion but treated the case as one
of unsecured bonds. 45 No attempt was made in the brief of counsel
for the Comptroller to sustain the tax on the ground of presence of
the mortgage security.
The next 46 case to appear before the Court of Appeals was Matter
of Fearing.47 Counsel there laid special emphasis upon the situs
of the mortgaged land within the state as giving a basis for the tax.
Mr. Justice Gray, however, expressed the court's refusal so to hold
as follows:

"The legal title to these bonds in question was transferred
by force of the laws of Rhode Island. As their legal and actual
situs was in a foreign state upon no theory were they within the
operation of our Transfer Tax Law. I am unable to perceive
the force of any argument which seeks to find in the feature
of the mortgage a reason'48for limiting the rule of law applied by
us in the Bronson case."
In Minnesota, which has the typical form of statute, the court has
taken a curious position in respect of the problem. The court in 19x5
"Matter of Bronson, supranote 37. The statute imposed a tax on all transfers
"when the transfer is by will or intestate law, of property within the state and
the decedent was a non-resident at the time of his death." L. 1892, Ch. 399, § I.
Another section of the statute defined the word "property" as meaning all property orinterest therein "over which this state has any jurisdiction for thepurposes
of taxation." § 22.
"Matter of Bronson, i App. Div. 546, 37 N. Y. Supp. 476 (ist Dept. 1896).
"The gist of-the opinion of the Court of Appeals is contained in the following
excerpt: "It is obvious that the state has no jurisdiction over a right of succession
which accrues under the laws of the foreign state * * * The legal title to these
bonds or the debts they represent, vested in the personal representatives of the
decedent by force of foreign laws * * * The legal situs of the indebtedness was at
the creditor's domicil and as the actual situs of the bonds themselves was, also,
there, upon no theory can it be held that the provisions of the Transfer Tax Act
could reach them in its operation." p. 8.
46In 1902 Matter of Preston was decided by the Appellate Division. Here
again the fact that the bonds were secured by mortgages on New York land was
not considered. The point decided was that there should be no distinction made
between
corporate and individual bonds.
47
Supra note 37.
48Matter of Fearing is cited with approval in Matter of Lowell, 2o8 App. Div.
201, 2o3 N. Y. Supp. 312 (ist Dept. 1924), aff'd. without opinion 239 N. Y.
532, z47 N. E. 183 (1924).
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passed upon the question whether unsecured notes of domestic
corporations held by a non-resident decedent were subject to the state
inheritance tax. 49 Following the dictum in Blackstone v. Miller,
in basing jurisdiction on the supposed necessity for the creditor to
invoke Minnesota law to enforce his claim and on the state's power
over the debtor, it held such notes to be taxable. A year later the
court was called upon to pass upon the taxability of registered bonds
of a Minnesota corporation, owned by a non-resident, which were
secured by a mortgage upon land in Minnesota and in six other
states.A0 Although the debtor was a "resident" of Minnesota and
subject to its power, still the court held the bond to be beyond
the taxing power of the State. It distinguished the earlier case on
the ground that in the case before it the debtor, being a corporation
doing business in six other states, was subject to the jurisdiction
of those states and the creditor could resort to any of them to enforce
his right. The jurisdiction of those other states was based upon
more than the accidental presence of the debtor. The same sort
of reasoning was used to reach the conclusion that the mortgage
security in Minnesota would not give the bonds a taxable situs there.
Since the mortgaged property in the other six states could be
resorted to, the bondholders would not have to invoke Minnesota law to enforce the bonds. The court declined to express an
opinion whether a mortgage of Minnesota land alone would give
the bonds a taxable situs within the state. It is submitted that such
a distinction illustrates the weakness of the doctrine of basing jurisdiction to tax upon power over the debtor or over the security and
upon the need of the creditor to resort to the laws of a state to enforce
the obligation. On the other hand, if the basis be the situs of the
property, these troublesome questions of where the debtor or his
domicil is, where he does business, where his property is, and the
value of his property in various places, can be avoided.
The courts of only one state, Michigan, have reached a conclusion
contrary to this bulk of authority. There are three cases of interest.
The first is In Re Stanton'sEstate.-" The finding of facts of the lower
court showed that the decedent was a resident of New York who had
left as a part of her estate promissory notes secured by mortgages
on Michigan land. The decision was that an inheritance tax was
4'9State ex rel Graff v. Probate Court, 128 Minn. 371, 15o N. W. 1094, L. R. A.
19i6A,
9Ol (1915).
60State v. Chadwick, 133 Minn. 117, 157 N. W, 1076, 158 N. W. 637, L. R. A.
19i6B, 1288 (x916).
ui 4 2 Mich. 491, IO5 N. W.

1122 (1905).
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payable upon these bonds. This was one of the errors assigned in
the appeal taken by the executor.
On appeal counsel for the executor argued that the inheritance
tax statute measured the tax by the property which was subject to
the state's general property tax, and not by the property which the
state had power to tax. This argument would have exempted
the notes. As is so often the case, the argument of counsel determined the appellate court's opinion. That court devoted most of
its opinion to a refutation of this argument, and properly held
that the statute was intended to reach all property within the jurisdiction of the state.12 It then quite correctly stated that the state
of situs has-power to tax the inheritance of property. With respect to
the question whether the notes had a situs and constituted property
within the state and hence were subject to the state's taxing power
the court said only this:
"Courts are properly concerned only with the questions of
legislative purpose and the power to give the ascertained purpose
effect. In this case, both of these questions are resolved against
the appellant."
The court neither considered the question on principle nor did it
consider the authorities, even though the question was one of first
impression in the state.
But the case cannot be cited even as a weak one against the current
of authority. It is easily distinguishable. The lower court had found
that the notes had been kept in Michigan by a resident agent of the
decedent. They had been kept there for purposes of collection, deposit and reinvestment. Clearly, then, they had acquired a "business
situs" within the state and were taxable there for that reason. This is
pointed out in the next case to arise. 3
In Re Stanton's Estatehas been given in some detail because it is the
case upon which the later Michigan cases were based and because it is
often cited as apposed to the current of authority.
In In Re Merriam's Estate a note and mortgage were kept by the
owner at his domicil, outside of Michigan. 4 The court held that this
62The words of the statute were those of the typical statute (see note i, supra),
with the following in addition: "Shall include all property or interest therein
whether situate within or without this state, over which this state has any jurisdiction for the purposes of taxation." Act No. 188, Laws of 1899, § 21.
5In re Merriam's Estate, 147 Mich. 63o, 631, xii N. .W. 196 (1907). "In re
Stanton's Estate, 142 Mich. 491, unqualifiedly holds that an inheritance tax
may be levied in this state upon notes and mortgages of, and contracts relating to,
land in' this State, owned by a resident of another State, but which notes and
mortgages have always been kept in Michigan for the purpose of collection and
reinvestment, though they might have been temporarily t;ken to New York."
See also S L. R. A. (N. S.) IIO4, note,
5147 Mich. 63, iii N. W. I96, 9 L. R. A. (w. s.) 1104, (1907).
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note was subject to the Michigan inheritance tax. Mr. Justice
Hooker in his brief opinion said:
"This has the sanction of the Federal Supreme Court. Blackstone v. Miller, i88 U. S. 203, 206, 23 Sup. Ct. 277, 47 L. Ed.
439, which applies the doctrine to a bank deposit, which it is
perhaps unnecessary to say established the relation of debtor
and creditor. The case does not seem to turn upon the situs
of the evidence-i. e., the record of the mortgage-of indebtedness. We are not called upon to consider so extreme a case,
for in the case before us the situs of the evidence of indebtedness,
and the land was in Michigan, as it was also in the Stanton
case."5
So the court here calls the record of the mortgage the "evidence of
the indebtedness" in an attempt to bring the case within the decision
in the Stanton case. It is submitted that this is unsound. The law
should not seize upon still another element in this complicated legal
relationship and use it to localize the obligation and subject it to
taxation in one place more. Furthermore, there is no authority for
such a view.
The third case to appear was In re Roger's Estate. 6 The facts
were identical with those in the Merriamcase which the court properly considered controlling. Rationalizing, Mr. Justice Moore pointed
out certain incidents of the relationship created by the note and
mortgage which might tend to show localization in Michigan. To
the usual one of the need of resort to Michigan law if the debts
were not paid, he added the requirements of the registry law and the
need for ancillary administration in Michigan. The mere statement
of these incidents is not convincing. They refer simply to the mortgage, the subordinate, not to the obligation, the principal thing in
the relationship. The court proceeded merely to quote at length the
dictum in Blackstone v. Miller with regard to power over the debtor
giving jurisdiction to tax the debt.
So the state was committed to a doctrine clearly against the weight
of the judicial opinion of the time-by three short, ill-considered
opinions 7 It stands alone in holding that the mortgage gives to
the bond or note a taxable situs within the state.
IV.
The approach of the courts in the cases mentioned thus far has
been made clear by the form of the question to which they addressed
themselves. Their eyes were focused upon the bond or note, upon
5Supra note 53 at p. 631.
'6149 Mich. 305, 112 N. W. 931, (1907).
57
See comments in McCaughlin v. Cluff, supra note 32.
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the intangible right owned by the decedent. Did that have a
taxable situs within the state, was their inquiry. The genesis of this
point of view was the old case State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds.
If the statute under consideration in terms imposed a tax upon
credits, debts, or bonds and notes, the approach would have been
the only possible one. But that of course was not true. The statutes,
as already pointed out, were general and included all property "within the State."5 Starting de novo, the question would naturally arise
whether, inthis bundle of legal right-s represente by a bond or note
and mortgage, there was any property or interest in property within
the state? Does the non-resident decedent own any interest in any
sort of property in the state where the mortgaged land is situated-a
much broader question than the one we have found asked and answered by the courts in the cases considered. Put in this way the
answer to the question seems clear: the bond or note holder has by
reason of the mortgage an interest in the mortgaged land. Whether
the interest be security title as it is in some states or a security lien as
it is in others, he has an interest in the res. That interest being an
interest in property within the state would be subject to the taxing
power and hence subject to a property and inheritance tax.
Authority for the property tax is found in Savings and Loan
Society v. Multnomah County59 and the numerous decisions following
it.10 Mr. Justice Gray stated the principle concisely in these words:
"The State may tax real estate mortgaged, as it may all
other property within its jurisdiction, at its full value. It may
do this either by taxing the whole to the mortgagor, or by
taxing to the mortgagee the interest therein represented by the
mortgage, and to the mortgagor the remaining interest in the
land. And it may, for the purposes of taxation, either treat the
mortgage debt as personal property, to be taxed, like other choses
in action, to the creditor at his domicil; or treat the mortgagee's interest in the land as real estate, to be taxed to him, like
other real property, at its situs."'
58

So the cases already presented and those now to be discussed cannot be
reconciled by finding a difference in the statutes dealt with in the two groups
of cases. Such a distinction has been suggested in a similar problem. See (I919)
32 HARV. L. REV. 587, 596.
"gSupranote 23. There the court was concerned with an Oregon statute which

provided that a mortgage should be taxed as land and the mortgagor and mortgagee each taxed to the value of his interest. Of the tax the court said: "The debt is
not taxed separately but only together with the mortgage; and is considered as
indebtedness within the state for no other purpose than to enable the mortgagor
to deduct the amount thereof from the assessment upon him * ** The result is that
nothing is taxed but the real estate mortgaged * * *"
Allen v. National State -Bank of Camden, 92- Md. 509, 48 AtI. 78 (19O);
Common Council v. Assessors, 91 Mich. 78, 51 N. W. 787 (*892); Mumford v.
Sewall,
'i Ore. 67, 4 Pac. 585 (1883).
6
'Supra note 23.
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Such an approach in cases involving an inheritance tax is found
in the decisions of two States-Massachusetts and Maryland. Let
us consider them in that order.
The way was paved for the consideration of the problem in Massachusetts by the case of McCurdy v. McCurdy.62 That was a case
arising under the inheritance tax statute and involved the question
whether land in Massachusetts owned by a non-resident decedent
should be taxed at its full value or whether there should be deducted
therefrom-the value of a mortgage so as to tax the inheritance of only
the equity of redemption. It was held that the equity of redemption
alone constituted property of the decedent within the jurisdiction
of the Commonwealth.
Four years later came the case of notes secured by mortgages
on Massachusetts land, the notes being owned by a non-resident
decedent-Kinney v. Treasurer & Receiver General. 3 The executor
filed a bill in equity asking instructions inter alia as to whether these
notes were property within the state and also as to what tax, if any,
he was obliged to pay to the treasurer of the Commonwealth.64
The court at the outset of its opinion considered, not the notes
nor the debts represented thereby, but the mortgage and the interests
created in the land. -It pointed out that the interest of the mortgagee
was included within the general property tax.65 It found the situation
to be merely the converse of McCurdy v. McCurdy. After having
held that the mortgagor was taxable under the inheritance tax
statute only to the extent of the equity of redemption, it seemed a
necessary complement to hold that the mortgagee was taxable
for the residue-the value of his interest in the land, in other words,
the amount of the debt.
Unfortunately, the court felt impelled to go further and tie up
the note with the mortgage:
"The debt belongs with the mortgage, and it must coexist
to give the mortgage validity. For that purpose it has a situs
within the jurisdiction where the land lies."
This, it is submitted, is surplusage and detracts from the strength
of the opinion. The important thing in the opinion, however, is
the court's approach to the problem. It is to the land and the various

62I97
3207

"The

Mass. 248, 83 N. E. 881 (1908).
Mass. 368, 93 N. E. 586, 35 L. R. A. (N. s.) 784 (1911).
tax, in the words of the statute, reached "all property within the juit-

diction of the Commonwealth, corporeal and incorporeal, and any interest there,
whether belonging to the inhabitants of the Commonwealth or not." St. 1907, P.
563, § i, as amended by St. 1909, c. 527, § i.
1909, c. 490, Part 1, § § 16, x8, 45; Sullivan v. Boston, i98 Mass. I19,
1St.
124, 84 N. E. 443 (i909).
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interests created therein by the mortgage that the court goes to
support the tax. The land is property within the state and hence
is subject to its taxing power.
That it is the interest in the land that is taxed in Massachusetts
becomes apparent from the next case to be decided. In I912 the tax
statute was amended so as to restrict the inheritance tax on estates
of non-residents to real estate or any interest therein. Therefore,
upon no theory of localization of the debt could the state tax the
inheritance of foreign held secured bonds or notes. The question arose
in Hawkridgev. Burrill,6"on facts identical with those in the Kinney
case. The court merely repeated what had been said in its opinion
in the Kinney case.
In Maryland the question arose in Helser v. State.6 ' Notes left by a
non-resident decedent secured by mortgages upon land in Maryland
were collected by an ancillary administrator and the mortgages
discharged. In as much as the administrator had paid the inheritance
tax without protest, the court held that under no circumstances
could it be recovered. The subsequent discussion of the validity
of the tax is, therefore, obiter dictum, but is at least indicative of the
court's attitude. Using the same method of approach that the
Massachusetts court had used-looking at the interests in the land
instead of the notes and the choses in action represented by them-the
court pronounced the tax valid. Mr. Justice Thomas said:
"** * John Helser, at the time of his death, had, by virtue of
the mortgages collected by the administrator, an interest or
estate in lands in Washington County which was protected
by the laws of this State, and * * * those laws having been invoked to enable the appellant to receive the amount of said
mortgage the
sum collected was subject to a collateral inherit68
ance tax.
V.

Thus the authorities consist of these two lines of decisions, two
different ways of approach. The focus of the attention upon the obliMass. 134, iii N. B. 707, (I916).
Md. 228, 97 Atl. 539 (1916). The statute concerned provided for a tax
upon "all estates, real, personal and mixed, money, public and private securities
for money of every kind passing from any person who may die seized and possessed therere
certain named beneficiaries
inherited
the property. Maryland Code, Article 8I, § I20.
68
Ibid, p. 236. The suggestion that the fact of ancillary administration and the
resulting use of the laws of the state are important must, it is submitted, be
regarded
as unsound.
If the
decedent
leftitproperty
within rendered
the state
its inheritance
is governed
bynon-resident
the law of the
state and
is that sertice
6223
67128

by the
sovereignhas
which
is the
theone
tax other
exacted.
Unfortunately,
the
suggestion
found
its quid
way pro
intoquo
at for
least
opinion:
Walker v.
People, supra note 16.

INHERITANCE TAX ON FOREIGN-HELDBONDS

189

gation, the main thing in the transaction, on the one hand, and
the emphasis upon the interests in the land created by the mortgage,
the subordinate thing, on the other. When the case shall be presented
to the Supreme Court for decision which road will it select? Will
that court follow the way marked by its early decision in State Tax
on Foreign Held Bonds and the weight of authority in the state
decisions and hold the tax invalid? Or, will it apply the principle
of Savings &' Loan Society v. Multnomah County and sustain the tax?
If the legislature intends to reach all property within its jurisdiction, which undoubtedly it does, it seems clear that the court
should scrutinize the property concerned not with an historical
slant, but with an eye to discovering whether there is any property
of the non-resident decedent within the State. If there is, then,
upon the established principles of legislative power and territorial
jurisdiction, that property is subject to the state's taxing power.
The conclusion seems inevitable: The principle of Savings 6 Loan
Society v. Multnomah County must be applied to inheritance taxes
and the inheritance of the bond or noteholder's interest in the mortgaged land must be held taxable by the state where the land is
situated.
The language in the opinions of the state courts, sometimes in
terms of construction of the statute, might lead one to believe that
one line of cases construed the statutes as attempting to levy atax
on the inheritance of foreign held bonds or notes while the other line
of cases interpreted the statutes as levying on the inheritance of the
mortgagee's interest in the land. If this were true, then the decision of
the Supreme Court would be determined by the circumstance whether
the decision being reviewed belonged to the one line of cases or
to the other. If to the first, the tax would be held invalid, if to the
second, it would be held valid. The unsatisfactory condition of
the law found in the state decisions would be continued.
Fortunately, however, the decisions of the state courts do not so
construe the statutes. As has already been pointed out either the
statutes leave no doubt of their meaning or the courts construe
them as meaning to include all property subject to the taxing power
of the state--and that means all property within the state. So
whichever line of cases the Supreme Court is concerned with, it is
free to consider the question whether the non-resident decedent
owned any property within the state.
Because of their importance in the financial structure of modern
industry, it will be well to mention specifically corporate bonds
issued under a trust indenture. This transaction differs from that
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already discussed in that a third person, the trustee, and not the
bondholder is the mortgagee. Looking at the rights of the bondholder we find that he has first of all his right in personam against
the corporate debtor; be can bring an action at law on his bond.61
In addition, although the bondholder has no legal interest in the
mortgaged land, the legal security title or lien being in the trustee,
he has an equitable security interest in the land. 0 As in any trust
the legal interest is held by the trustee for the benefit of the cestui
que trust. So if the trustee improperly refuses or is unable to protect
the bondholder by foreclosure, the bondholder may enforce his lien
directly by a bill in equity.71
This equitable interest in the mortgaged land is clearly property
within the state where the land is situated. Therefore, whether the
bondholder's interest in the land be equitable as here or legal as
in the case of the single bond or note and mortgage, it may be subjected to an inheritance tax by the state of situs.7 1

The result in

either case is the same: the tax is a constitutional exercise of the
legislative power of the state.
89
Manning v. Norfolk Southern R. R. Co., 29 Fed. 838 (1887); Rothschild v.
Rio GrandeWestern Railway Co., 84Hun 103,32 N. Y. Supp. 37, af'd. 164 N. Y.
584, 58 N. E. 1092 (1895); Fleming v. Fairmont & Mannington R. R. Co., 72
W. Va. 835, 79 S. E. 826 (1913), and cases cited in note in 49 L. R. A. (N. s.)

155.
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Fortneyv. Carter, 17o Fed. 463 (i909), aff'd. 202 Fed. 454 (1913); O'Beirne
v. Allegheny & Kinzua R. R. Co., 15x N. Y. 372, 45 N. E. 873 (1897); Green v.
Peoples'
Gas Light & Coke Co., 138 N. Y. Misc. I, 192 N. Y. Supp. 232 (1922).
2
Brown v. Denver Omnibus & Cab Co., 254 Fed. 6o (1918); Cochran v.
Pittsburg S. & N. R. Co., i5o Fed. 682 (1907); Seibert v. Minneapolis & St.
Louis Railway Co., 52 Minn. 148, 53 N. W. 1134 (1893); Ettlinger v. Persia Rug
& Carpet Co., 142 N. Y. i89, 36 N. E. 1055 (1894).
7Cf

cases of shares in real estate trusts: Baker v. Commissioner of Corpo-

rations & Taxation, 253 Mass. 130, 148 N. E. 593, (1925); Priestly v. Treasurer &Receiver General, 230 Mass. 452, 12o N. E. io5 (r918); Peabody v. Treasurer
& Receiver General, 215 Mass. 129, 102 N. E. 435 (1913); Kinney v. Treasurer
& Receiver General, 207 Mass. 36o, 93 N. E. 586 (i'ii).

